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“Regulating E-Cigarettes: Why Policies Diverge”1 
 
Eric A. Feldman, University of Pennsylvania Law School 
 
Conference celebrating the work of Malcolm Feeley, October 2015 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
From their origins in the laboratory of a Chinese pharmacist in 2003 to their 
place in the portfolios of the world’s largest tobacco companies, electronic 
cigarettes have emerged as one of the most popular and controversial products of 
the 21st century. Some current smokers see e-cigarettes as offering an 
opportunity to reduce their dependence on conventional combustible tobacco 
products and instead make use of a potentially less dangerous substitute. Others, 
particularly young non-smokers, embrace e-cigarettes because they offer a taste 
of the unknown, a chance to assert independence by using a new product that 
they see as edgy and experimental. Public health professionals are divided about 
the health consequences of e-cigarettes, with some arguing that they will 
perpetuate or even exacerbate the public health harms caused by conventional 
                                                      
1 I am grateful for the exemplary research assistance of Brian Ruocco and abundant bibliographical help from 
Timothy Von Dulm. Support for this paper was generously provided by a University of Pennsylvania Law School 
Summer Research Grant.  
 
cigarettes and others claiming that they will reduce tobacco-related morbidity 
and mortality. For many, e-cigarettes represent an attractive business 
opportunity; from single-proprietor vaping shops in suburban malls to 
multinational companies with global tobacco holdings, e-cigarettes have taken 
root as an important new consumer product.  
Faced with such diverse perspectives, what are regulators doing to control 
the manufacture, sale, and use of e-cigarettes? The answer, perhaps surprising in 
this age of supposed globalization, depends in large part upon where those 
regulators are located. Public Health England (PHE), for example, has embraced 
the e-cigarette, recently stating that “vaping is at least 95% less harmful than 
smoking” and highlighting “the large difference in relative risk” between smoking 
and vaping “so that more smokers are encouraged to make the switch”(McNeill et 
al. 2018). PHE’s enthusiasm for e-cigarettes is reflected in the widespread use of 
e-cigarettes in England, where 6% of the adult population are vapers, almost all of 
whom are smokers or ex-smokers (McNeill et al. 2018, 14). In contrast, regulators 
in 25 countries as diverse as the UAE, Brazil, Panama, and Singapore have banned 
the sale and/or use of e-cigarettes (Kennedy et al. 2017)  Where e-cigarettes are 
not banned they are regulated in widely different ways, ranging from the 
stringent imposition of pharmaceutical regulations to lax consumer product 
controls (Ibid). 
Although the texture of e-cigarette regulations is highly variable, it would 
be an exaggeration to suggest that the forces of globalization are entirely absent. 
The most significant example of transnational e-cigarette regulation is found in 
the European Community, where the European Parliament approved a revision of 
the Tobacco Products Directive (TPD) in 2014 (Directive (2014/40/EU). The revised 
TPD, which came into force in May 2016, applies many pre-existing tobacco 
control policies to e-cigarettes, such as banning advertising, requiring child-proof 
packaging, and including packet health warnings. In addition, it includes 
regulations specific to e-cigarettes, such as setting the maximum size of e-
cigarette refill containers (10ml), the maximum concentration of nicotine in e-
liquid (20 mg/ml), the maximum size of liquid tanks (2ml), and requirements that 
e-cigarettes use liquids “that do not pose a risk to human health in heated or 
unheated form,” that “electronic cigarettes deliver the nicotine doses at 
consistent levels,” and that the packaging include a detailed list of ingredients.  
Even within the EU, however, policy differences remain, and beyond the EU 
the regulation of e-cigarettes varies dramatically across borders. What explains 
the divergence of e-cigarette policies globally? Why haven’t we seen the 
opposite—general convergence of laws and regulations governing the sale and 
use of e-cigarettes?  
This paper explores the landscape of e-cigarette policy globally by looking 
at three jurisdictions that have taken starkly different approaches to regulating e-
cigarettes—the US, Japan, and China. Each of those countries has a robust 
tobacco industry, government agencies entrusted with protecting public health, 
an active and sophisticated scientific and medical community, and a regulatory 
structure for managing new pharmaceutical, tobacco, and consumer products. All 
three are signatories of the World Health Organization’s (WHO) Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control (United Nations 2003),2 all are signatories of the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS 
Agreement) (World Intellectual Property Organization n.d.), and all are members 
of the World Trade Organization (World Trade Organization, Understanding n.d.). 
Which legal, economic, social and political differences between the three 
countries explain their diverse approaches to regulating e-cigarettes? Why have 
they embraced such dramatically different postures toward e-cigarettes?  
Although Malcolm has not (yet!) studied e-cigarettes, this paper builds on 
his legacy in several ways. First, a great deal of Malcolm’s work is explicitly or 
                                                      
2 In addition, both China and Japan have ratified the FCTC, but not the US. 
implicitly comparative. He is always thinking about the full spectrum of possible 
answers to the questions he poses; considering cross-border similarities and 
differences between legal institutions; questioning assumptions about how 
politics, economics, law, and society interact; and probing to see how different 
institutional configurations might lead to different legal outcomes. E-cigarette 
regulation invites exactly that type of analysis. What differentiates policy 
approaches to e-cigarettes has little to do with science or with the nature of e-
cigarette devices. Instead, the differences are institutional, political, economic, 
sociological, legal. In that way, e-cigarette regulation provides a window through 
which to examine the foundation, and the operation, of different legal systems –  
Malcolm’s stock and trade.  
This paper also owes a debt to Malcolm’s work on complex policy choices, 
in which he undertakes an almost surgical dismantling of policy options. He would 
surely relish the opportunity to put the full set of e-cigarette regulatory options 
on the operating table and use his analytical scalpel to demonstrate their costs 
and benefits. Third, Malcolm is a brilliant theorist, but I have always been even 
more impressed by his commitment to the law in action, and particularly by his 
focus on the impact of legal rules and practices on those who are less fortunate. 
E-cigarettes invite exactly that set of concerns; at root, the issues raised by e-
cigarettes implicate basic questions of values and social justice, and the degree to 
which e-cigarettes might exacerbate or alleviate the disproportionate harm 
combustible tobacco imposes on those with less education and income. 
 
E-CIGARETTE POLICY: CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE 
Over the past several decades the idea of policy convergence has garnered 
increasing attention among legal scholars, political scientists, scholars of 
international relations, and others, who have identified specific regulated 
activities in which policies converge and theorized the how(s) and why(s) of 
convergence (Linos 2013; Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett 2006).3 This paper takes 
a different approach. It highlights a concrete policy question—whether and how 
to regulate electronic cigarettes—and asks why the regulatory paths followed in 
three countries have led one to treat e-cigarettes as tobacco products (the US), 
another as pharmaceutical products (Japan), and a third as ordinary consumer 
products (China). Scientific and epidemiological data about e-cigarettes travels 
easily across borders; public health officials in those countries have multiple 
                                                      
3 See generally KATERINA LINOS, THE DEMOCRATIC FOUNDATIONS OF POLICY DIFFUSION: HOW HEALTH, FAMILY AND EMPLOYMENT 
LAWS SPREAD ACROSS COUNTRIES (2013) (arguing that policy convergence occurs because of the backing of a 
technocratic elite and because of the support of ordinary voters); Beth A. Simmons et al., Introduction: The 
International Diffusion of Liberalism 60 INT’L ORG. 781 (2006) (positing that the worldwide spread of political and 
economic liberalism is produced interdependently – i.e., that governments adopt new policies not in isolation, but 
in response to coercion, cross-border learning, and emulation). 
points of connection; political leaders have a shared interest in limiting 
unnecessary health risks and avoiding unnecessary expenditures; for those and 
other reasons, convergence rather than divergence would appear to be the most 
likely policy outcome. Why, then, have the United States, Japan, and China –each 
of which is home to one of the world’s most successful tobacco companies, has a 
large segment of the population that suffers from tobacco-related diseases, and 
spends billions of dollars caring for people whose deaths are preventable--
followed such different paths?   
There is, of course, a short and simple answer. Policies in the US, Japan, and 
China frequently diverge, be it trade policy, tax policy, health care policy, and 
more (KPMG 2015).4 The three nations are differently situated economically, 
diplomatically, politically, and culturally, and those differences generate different 
policy preferences. Indeed, one might argue that policy convergence in the area 
                                                      
4 Japan, China, and the United States have very different tax structures. See, e.g., KPMG, 2015 Global Tax Trade 
Survey, https://www.kpmg.com/CN/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/global-tax-rate-surevy-
2015-O-201510.pdf (recording, for instance that social security taxes on employers is 35% in China, 14.7% in Japan, 
and 7.65% in the United States, and the corporate tax rates are 25% in China, 33.06% in Japan, and 40% in the 
United States). These countries have had divergent experiences with healthcare policy. See The Shifting Landscape 
of Healthcare in Asia-Pacific: A Look at Australia, China, India, Japan, and South Korea, THE ECONOMIST (2015), 
http://www.eiuperspectives.economist.com/sites/default/files/The%20shifting%20landscape%20of%20healthcare
%20in%20Asia-Pacific_Oct%205_0.pdf; Naoki Ikegami & Gerard F. Anderson, In Japan, All-Payer Rate Setting Under 
Tight Government Control Has Proved to Be An Effective Approach to Containing Costs, 31 HEALTH AFF. 1049 
(comparing the healthcare paying systems for Japan and the United States). The trading policies and outcomes for 
these countries differ as well. See Trade Profiles, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, 
http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/WSDBCountryPFReporter.aspx?Language=E (select China, Japan, and United 
States, then select “continue”).  
of e-cigarettes, not policy divergence, would be the greater surprise. But to do so 
would ignore the burgeoning literature on globalization and policy convergence, 
which makes a compelling argument for why there should be at least some 
degree of e-cigarette policy convergence in the US, Japan, and China (Linos 2013; 
Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett 2006; Fullerton and Alvarez 2012; Scherer 1997).5  
Recent scholarship on cross-border cooperation and global networks in the 
area of finance, for example, like Terry Halliday and Greg Shaffer’s Transnational 
Legal Orders, highlights the growth of powerful transnational financial 
institutions. Halliday and Shaffer argue that the influence of cross-border financial 
institutions has muted the differences between national regulatory approaches 
and increased the degree to which they overlap. Countries across the globe, in 
their view, when confronted by similar policy questions, deploy common 
regulatory strategies and construct similar regulatory institutions (Halliday and 
Shaffer 2016).  
Anne-Marie Slaughter’s A New World Order offers a related set of 
arguments about the increasing amount of policy commonality among the world’s 
                                                      
5 See generally KATERINA LINOS, THE DEMOCRATIC FOUNDATIONS OF POLICY DIFFUSION: HOW HEALTH, FAMILY AND EMPLOYMENT 
LAWS SPREAD ACROSS COUNTRIES (2013); Beth A. Simmons et al., Introduction: The International Diffusion of Liberalism 
60 INT’L ORG. 781 (2006); see, e.g., Larry Fullerton & Megan Alvarez, Convergence in International Merger Control, 
26 ANTITRUST 20 (2012) (discussing policy convergence regarding merger control regulations); F.M. Scherer, 
Competition Poilcy Convergence: Where Next?, 24 INT’L BUS. LAW 485 (1996) (describing the convergence in national 
competition policies as a result of the intensification of globalized trade).  
nations. She highlights the importance of global networks—judges, legislators, the 
police, bankers, ministers, trade officials, and others—and argues that they have 
become critically important actors in the shaping of both national and global 
policy.6 Hers is a vision of governance that has its locus not in unitary state action 
but in the simultaneous interaction of multiple networks, which negotiate and 
influence each other as they address common problems (Slaughter 2005, 5).  
Viewed through this lens, one should expect e-cigarette policy to be shaped not 
by isolated nation-states but through the cross-border interaction of public health 
experts, tobacco and pharmaceutical company executives; government officials 
specializing in finance, health, and drugs; legislators; and more. Such interaction 
would presumably lead to a set of policy outcomes that share at least some key 
features, not outcomes that are fundamentally at odds. 
One network of actors with a strong interest in e-cigarette regulation is 
made up of scientists, epidemiologists, and other public health experts and 
policymakers whose work involves the collection and interpretation of data about 
the health impact of e-cigarettes. The network is relatively small and tightly knit; 
many members train at the same schools, attend the same conferences, read and 
                                                      
6 One might see Slaughter’s approach as a similar but somewhat thicker web of actors as that described by Feeley 
et al in Terence C. Halliday, Lucien Karpik, and Malcolm M. Feeley, eds, Fighting for Political Freedom: Comparative 
Studies of the Legal Complex and Political Liberalism, Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, 2007.  
 
publish in the same journals, and are invited to the same international meetings 
at the WHO and elsewhere. Network members also share a common goal, 
reflective of the public health field more generally—to limit preventable illness 
and death. Given those circumstances, one might expect similar, if not identical, 
epidemiological findings and policy prescriptions for managing e-cigarettes to 
emerge from such a group. 
Despite the various reasons for expecting some degree of e-cigarette policy 
convergence, it is difficult, at least so far, to find any evidence of such 
convergence. Instead, e-cigarette regulations in the US, Japan, and China have 
taken dramatically different forms. Three factors help to explain why.  
First, some degree of scientific consensus, which is often a necessary 
(though rarely a sufficient) condition for policy convergence, is missing. Although 
scientists around the world are studying the health consequences of e-cigarettes 
on users and bystanders, even basic scientific and epidemiological agreement is 
lacking. To what extent do e-cigarettes imperil the health of those who use them? 
How risky is the secondhand vapor of e-cigarettes to children and other 
bystanders? Does the use of e-cigarettes among youth make it more likely that 
they will become smokers of combustible tobacco? As will be discussed in more 
detail below, the honest response to all of these questions is “we don’t know.” 
Consequently, policy makers are relatively unconstrained by the data; they can 
advocate a wide variety of policy approaches, all of which are defensible in light 
of current scientific uncertainty. 
Second, economic and political interests are rarely divorced from policy 
outcomes, and in the area of e-cigarettes those interests are particularly 
pronounced. In the US, for example, the growth, manufacture, and sale of 
tobacco products has been left to the corporate sector, which evaded substantial 
regulation by the federal government until 2009. In contrast, the Japanese 
government created a monopoly in the early 20th century that controlled all 
aspects of the tobacco business. The monopoly was turned into a publicly traded 
company, Japan Tobacco, Inc., in 1985, but even today the Ministry of Finance 
continues to hold one third of its stock. The Chinese central government also has 
a tobacco monopoly (the China National Tobacco Corporation, or CNTC), but 
unlike Japan there has not been a move toward privatization. It is the world’s 
largest manufacturer of cigarettes in a country that consumes approximately 30% 
of the world’s tobacco products, and is a critical source of revenue for the central 
government. In each of the three countries, the distinctive institutional 
configuration and financial interests of the tobacco sector have powerfully 
influenced e-cigarette policy, and help to explain their divergent approaches.  
Third, although the role and prominence of courts as policymaking bodies 
clearly differs across borders, courts are not often highlighted as an explanation 
for policy divergence. When it comes to e-cigarettes, however, litigation and 
judicial decisions have been active components of policymaking in the US, 
whereas in both Japan and China the courts have been silent. Indeed, were it not 
for litigation over e-cigarette regulation in the US, the government’s approach to 
e-cigarettes would look much more like Japan’s. This is not to suggest that courts 
in the US are engaged in inappropriate judicial activism, but simply to point out 
that interested parties in the US quickly turned to the courts to adjudicate 
different perspectives on how e-cigarettes should be regulated, and the courts 
obliged by issuing judgments that have fundamentally shaped government 
regulation. Each of these three factors will be discussed in greater detail below.  
 
E-CIGARETTES: TECHNOLOGY, USE, AND IMPACT ON HEALTH 
A. What is an Electronic Cigarette? 
Before regulating any product, regulators must describe and define what it 
is they are regulating. For e-cigarettes, that turns out to be extremely difficult 
(Lempert, Grana, and Glantz 2014).7 The first e-cigarettes to reach the market, 
and the ones that are most visually similar to combustible cigarettes, are known 
as cig-a-likes because they have the shape, look, and feel of a conventional 
cigarette. Manufacturers quickly realized that cig-a-likes had an important 
downside—by mimicking the aesthetic of cigarettes, consumers sensibly 
associated them with cigarettes. For many consumers that was a negative 
association, given the well-known health risks of smoking and the pejorative 
moral undertones of doing so. Indeed, many e-cigarette users are keen to 
distinguish themselves from smokers and disassociate their devices from 
conventional cigarettes.8 
As a result, a plethora of other products now use a similar technology to 
cig-a-likes but take a different form. Those products, collectively known as 
vaporizers and sometimes called vaping pens, e-hookahs, and more, can take a 
variety of forms (Mistic E Cigs 2015).9 Some are rectangular, others look like 
skulls, a particularly popular device (Juul) is shaped like a USB drive, and a few 
                                                      
7 Although there is a generic term for e-cigarettes—electronic nicotine delivery systems (ENDS)—it covers a wide 
variety of products. For simplicity, this paper uses the term e-cigarette to refer to the complete range of available 
devices. See Lauren K. Lempert, The Importance of Product Definitions in US E-Cigarette Laws and Regulations, 
BMJ: TOBACCO CONTROL (2014), http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/early/2014/12/14/tobaccocontrol-2014-
051913.full.pdf. 
8 Those who use vaporizers, and e-cigarettes more generally, call themselves vapers, not smokers. 
9 These devices are sometimes lumped into a category called vapor-tanks-mods, or VTMs. See  
http://www.vaporworldexpo.com/PDFs/Vapor_World_Expo_Key_Takeaways.pdf.  
appear to have come out of Apple’s creative department, with slick and appealing 
contours and colors. The market for vaporizers has expanded rapidly and the 
devices have changed apace, with some of the newest products featuring options 
like adjustable wattage, which allows consumers to change the amount of vapor 
inhaled from each puff.  
Despite their aesthetic differences, all e-cigarettes are based on a common 
technology. They include a rechargeable battery, a liquid (or in a few cases a 
chamber that can be filled with leaf) that generally contains nicotine, an atomizer 
that converts liquid into vapor, an LED light to simulate a burning cigarette, and a 
computer chip that senses inhalation and triggers the atomizer. Some e-cigarettes 
come prepackaged with a liquid-filled container and are discarded when all of the 
liquid is vaporized. Others operate on the same principle as Nescafe coffee 
machines; a reusable device that is recharged with disposable pods. Still others 
contain liquid chambers that can be refilled by consumers with whatever e-liquid 
they prefer, or vaporize leaf tobacco rather than liquid. 
One factor that makes it difficult to regulate e-cigarettes, therefore, is the 
rapidity with which the technology has, and continues to, evolve. The question 
‘what is an e-cigarette’ does not have a simple or clear answer, and without a 
crisp definition of an e-cigarette regulators have struggled to develop a regulatory 
strategy. Japanese officials in the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, for 
example, have stated that they are not able to specify the meaning of ‘e-
cigarette,’ and as a result they worry about the coherence of e-cigarette 
regulation (MHLW officials, personal communication with author, December 
2014.).  
B. How Popular are E-Cigarettes? 
While the US e-cigarette market is still modest in comparison to the $94 
billion in annual sales of combustible cigarettes, some analysts, like Bonnie 
Herzog at Wells Fargo, have predicted that over the next two decades the market 
for e-cigarettes may surpass that for combustible cigarettes (Euromonitor 
International 2017; NACS 2013). Overall, electronic cigarette sales in the US have 
been increasing rapidly,  from just $20 million in 2008 to an estimated $5.5 billion 
in 2018. The global market for e-cigarettes has also exploded, andis projected to 
growa at least 20% annually, reaching an estimated $48 billion by 2023 (Business 
Wire, 2018).  Retail outlets for e-cigarettes have also proliferated. Just a few years 
ago there were no specialty vaping stores. Today, every major city in the US has 
dozens, often hundreds, of such shops, which in total numbered over 15,000 in 
2015 (Mincer 2015). Those shops are frequented by the ever-increasing number 
of vapers.. Although estimates vary, the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) in 2016 reported that 15.4% of adults aged 18 years of age or 
older had tried e-cigarettes, and 11.3% of high school students had used e-
cigarettes in the past 30 days (CDC 2017; CDC 2018).  In Japan, because of strict 
regulation (see below), vaping is almost nonexistent. Data on e-cigarette use in 
China is spotty, but since 2013 China’s domestic e-cigarette market has grown 
quickly, with knowledgeable insiders claiming that over the next 5 to 10 years the 
market will increase by more than 30% annually, and in the coming decades will 
overtake conventional combustible cigarettes (Feldman and Yue 2016; People 
2014). 
C. Are E-Cigarettes Harmful?  
Not only is it difficult to identify the key qualities and market size of e-
cigarettes; it is also challenging to determine whether e-cigarettes will ultimately 
harm or enhance public health. A growing number of researchers globally are 
studying the health consequences of vaping, particularly: What is the impact of 
vaping on the health of vapers? Does vaping harm the heath of bystanders? Will 
e-cigarettes substitute for, or be used in addition to, combustible cigarettes? How 
popular will e-cigarettes be among people below the age of 18? Are the chemicals 
used to flavor e-liquid harmful? Will e-cigarettes be an effective harm reduction 
device for those who want to quit smoking? Might e-cigarettes create an 
atmosphere of public tolerance toward vaping that risks ‘re-normalizing’ the use 
of combustible cigarettes?  
Because data collection and analysis will take many years, at this point it is 
impossible to accurately answer any of the key questions involving e-cigarettes 
and health. Surely there are reasons for both optimism and concern. If e-
cigarettes are capturing the interest of youth, for example, who first vape and 
then turn to combustible cigarettes, long-running declines in tobacco 
consumption could level off or be reversed. If current smokers turn to e-cigarettes 
to supplement but not substitute for cigarette consumption, then e-cigarettes 
might be reducing the number of people who quit smoking. If certain components 
of e-cigarettes, perhaps contained in e-liquid base ingredients or flavorings, turn 
out to be harmful, then e-cigarettes could be ushering in a new era of cancers and 
other diseases. On the other hand, e-cigarettes might be helping current smokers 
quit, keeping youth from initiating smoking, and playing a key role in reducing 
tobacco-related morbidity and mortality.  
Scientific uncertainty appears to have heightened the tenor of the debate 
between those who see little but danger in e-cigarettes and those who embrace 
them as the centerpiece of a harm reduction strategy. .11 Stanton Glantz, for 
example, who runs the Center for Tobacco Control Research and Education at the 
University of California, San Francisco, argues that his research demonstrates that 
“among youth who had experimented with cigarettes but had not progressed to 
established smoking, additional use of e-cigarettes was positively associated with 
future onset of current established smoking  (Chaffee, Watkins, and Glantz 
2018).” Thomas Glynn of the American Cancer Society offers a different 
interpretation, arguing that “[t]he data in [Glantz’s] study do not allow many of 
the broad conclusions that it draws.” Glynn, in a review of e-cigarettes, expanded 
upon his view.     
“If, at some point in the very near future, the preponderance of objective 
data show e-cigarettes to be demonstrably unsafe and/or ineffective, we 
will want to move on to other approaches that can lower the appalling toll 
from cigarette smoking. Or, in a similarly abbreviated time span, if objective 
data demonstrate their safety compared with combusted cigarettes and 
their effectiveness compared with current treatment approaches for 
                                                      
11 Combustible tobacco has approximately eighty carcinogens and the scientific evidence of their negative impact 
on health is overwhelming. Most (but not all) e-cigarettes vaporize a nicotine-containing liquid, which makes them 
potentially addictive. But nicotine is not what kills smokers and is not likely to be the key vector of whatever harm 
may be caused by e-cigarettes. Although it is possible that e-cigarettes contain certain carcinogens in 
concentrations that will affect vapers, such harms are, at least at this point, hypothetical. 
tobacco dependence, then smokers can add e-cigarettes to the menu of 
options they can use to end their combusted cigarette habit and extend 
their lives (Glynn 2014).” 
If Glantz represents the critical end of the spectrum of views about the 
health impact of e-cigarettes, and Glynn is positioned in the middle, other 
respected scientists have a decidedly positive view of e-cigarettes.  David Abrams, 
the Executive Director of the Schroeder Institute for Tobacco Research and Policy 
Studies at the Legacy Foundation, is perhaps the most prominent example.  
Abrams is enthusiastic about the potential of e-cigarettes to greatly reduce 
tobacco-related morbidity and mortality, arguing that ”if most current American 
smokers switched to vaping e-cigarettes over the next 10 years, there could be as 
many as 6.6 million fewer premature deaths and 86.7 million fewer life years 
would be lost (New York University 2018).”  
For now, the weight of objective, professional opinion favors the middle 
ground. As the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has stated, 
“E-cigarettes have not been fully studied, so consumers currently don’t know the 
potential risks of e-cigarettes when used as intended, how much nicotine or other 
potentially harmful chemicals are being inhaled during use, or whether there are 
any benefits associated with using these products. Additionally, it is not known 
whether e-cigarettes may lead young people to try other tobacco products, 
including conventional cigarettes, which are known to cause disease and lead to 
premature death (U.S. Food and Drug Administration 2017).” Similarly, an August 
2015 report of the US National Institutes of Health notes that e-cigarettes “have 
not been thoroughly evaluated in scientific studies. This may change in the near 
future, but for now, very little data exists on the safety of e-cigarettes, and 
consumers have no way of knowing whether there are any therapeutic benefits or 
how the health effects compare to conventional cigarettes (National Institute on 
Drug Abuse 2017).” That finding was echoed in an authoritative review conducted 
by the National Academies, which concluded that “e-cigarettes cannot be simply 
categorized as either beneficial or harmful to health. The net public health 
outcome depends on the balance between adverse outcomes (increased youth 
initiation of combustible tobacco cigarettes, low or even decreased cessation 
rates in adults, and a high-risk profile) and positive outcomes (very low youth 
initiation, high cessation rates in adults, and a low-risk profile) (National 
Academies 2018)”. 
In contrast to the uncertainty about e-cigarettes expressed by government 
officials in the US, policymakers in England have been far more enthusiastic. . 
Public Health England, for example, has vigorously embraced e-cigarettes, 
declaring that “vaping poses only a small fraction of the risks of smoking and 
switching completely from smoking to vaping conveys substantial health benefits 
over continued smoking  (McNeill et al. 2018).”  In contrast, although China 
manufacturers over 90% of the world’s electronic cigarettes, there have been no 
Chinese studies on the health consequences of vaping, and the government has 
devoted scant energy to studying the impact of e-cigarettes on youth, on current 
smokers (of which China has more than any other country in the world), or on 
bystanders (Feldman and Yue 2016). In Japan, one finds a similar cleavage 
between public health researchers as in the US. Some experts, like those working 
at the National Cancer Center in Tokyo, express strong reservations about the 
safety of e-cigarettes, whereas others, particularly those based in Osaka, have 
endorsed e-cigarettes as an effective harm reduction technology ( Personal 
communication with author).  
Public health policy rarely rests on a bed of scientific certainty. But the wide 
range of views among experts about the safety of e-cigarettes goes well beyond 
the usual lack of consensus. Some researchers consider e-cigarettes themselves to 
be harmful, or believe that e-cigarettes will encourage the use of combustible 
tobacco and insist that they be banned or aggressively regulated. Others conclude 
that e-cigarettes are an effective harm reduction tool, and should be made 
available to the many people for whom they could provide a benefit. These 
opposing policy options, both lacking strong empirical support, help to explain the 
lack of policy convergence in the regulation of e-cigarettes. Faced with an array of 
policy options and little scientific support for any particular policy outcome, 
policymakers have instead based their policy choices on other factors—political 
pressure, financial opportunities and constraints, their perception of the public 
good, and more. One can see the result of the lack of scientific consensus in the 
current e-cigarette policies of the US, Japan, and China. In the US, the FDA  has 
moved haltingly toward e-cigarette regulation; after an initial effort to regulate e-
cigarettes as pharmaceutical products was challenged in court, the agency 
decided to treat them as tobacco products, but has so far failed to issue specific 
regulations. Various municipalities, cities, and states have developed their own e-
cigarette policies, most of which fold e-cigarettes into existing tobacco control 
law.  
Compared to the absence of national policy in the US, Japan has followed a 
much more aggressive path. Policy makers in the Ministry of Health, Labor, and 
Welfare have concluded that the nicotine in e-cigarettes is a drug, meaning that 
e-cigarettes fall under the umbrella of pharmaceutical regulation.12 To market 
                                                      
12 E-cigarettes that do not contain nicotine are not affected by the regulations. 
their products, manufacturers of e-cigarettes are therefore required to submit 
data to the Ministry demonstrating that their products are both safe and 
effective. Since they currently have no such data, nicotine-containing e-cigarettes 
cannot be marketed. Japan’s de facto e-cigarette ban stands in stark contrast to 
the Chinese government’s approach. There, health officials, finance officials, 
pharmaceutical regulators, and others have seemingly ignored the debate over e-
cigarettes in the US, Europe, Japan, and elsewhere, and have allowed e-cigarettes 
to be manufactured, sold, and consumed in a regulatory vacuum.  
In an era when scholars so often see policy convergence as the norm, the 
inconsistency one finds in e-cigarette policy is notable.13 The absence of robust 
scientific data about the health impact of e-cigarettes is critical to explaining that 
inconsistency. Freed from the constraints of robust epidemiological and scientific 
findings, policymakers in the US, Japan, and China have adopted three 
dramatically different approaches to e-cigarette regulation, ranging from the de 
facto prohibition of e-cigarettes to a highly permissive, unregulated posture. But 
science is not the only factor that explains regulatory divergence. The political and 
economic forces that have shaped tobacco policy in different nations are also a 
crucial part of the explanation. 
                                                      
13 See supra N.3 for a small sample of the literature on policy convergence. 
 
LAW, POLITICS, AND MARKETS: THE IMPACT OF TOBACCO POLICY ON E-
CIGARETTE REGULATION 
When e-cigarettes entered the global marketplace in 2003, they did so 
against a background that was etched by over a century of conflict over tobacco 
regulation. In the US, industrialists in the early 20th century worked hard to ensure 
that tobacco products escaped government control (Kluger 1997; Brandt 2009). 
They used their growing wealth—soon, they would be among the largest 
companies in the US, and the world—to influence local politicians, hire prominent 
law firms, and recruit top advertising agencies, and for over a century succeeded 
in minimizing the regulation of combustible tobacco products. The FDA, created in 
1927 as the Food, Drug and Insecticide Administration and renamed in 1930, had 
no jurisdiction over tobacco, so federal regulation came primarily from the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC), which in 1966 imposed limits on tobacco 
advertising and required warnings on cigarette packets  (U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration 2018; Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1966). 
Over time, states and municipalities picked up some of the regulatory slack, and 
by the late 20th century had developed a web of clean air and workplace 
restrictions. 
Calls for more government regulation of tobacco started early in the 20th 
century, but it was not until the publication of the Surgeon General’s 1964 Report 
“Smoking and Health,” which clearly identified smoking as a cause of lung cancer, 
that tobacco control advocates had a firm scientific footing (U.S. Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare 1964). The report catalyzed the emergence of a 
powerful tobacco control movement, triggered a long, steady decline in tobacco 
consumption, and ushered in a half century of tort litigation brought by smokers 
who accused the industry of acting negligently and defective products. Most of 
their claims failed, but they spawned additional lawsuits against the industry by 
state and federal government (Rabin 1991-1992; Rabin 2001). In 2009, Congress 
granted the FDA authority to regulate tobacco products, and some optimistic 
tobacco control advocates declared that ‘the end of tobacco’ was at hand 
(Tobacco Control 2013; Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act 
2009).14  
At least initially, e-cigarette companies have little in common with their 20th 
century predecessors. The industry, if one can call it that, was made up of 
individual entrepreneurs who imported small quantities of merchandise from e-
                                                      
14 Tobacco control, special issue on tobacco endgame; Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, 
H.R.1256, Public Law 111-31, June 22, 2009. It is the 2009 law that the FDA is using to assert regulatory authority 
over e-cigarettes. 
cigarette manufacturers in China, and sold it either online or in small shops. As 
the popularity of e-cigarettes increased, however, the nature of the e-cigarette 
business quickly changed, and what was originally a niche product is now a 
multibillion-dollar global industry controlled by some of the world’s richest 
companies. Lorillard, for example, purchased the US market-leading e-cigarette, 
Blu, for $135 million in 2012 and sold it in 2014 (along with several of its tobacco 
brands) to Imperial Tobacco in a $7.1 billion deal (Solomon 2014).15 Altria Group, 
the parent company of Philip Morris, joined with its international spinoff, Philip 
Morris International, to develop and market MarkTen, Green Smoke, and iQOS, 
and in 2014 purchased UK e-cigarette company Nicocigs. R.J. Reynold’s popular e-
cigarette, Vuse, was released in 2014, and for a while controlled  almost 1/3 of 
the US market (Craver 2015). British American Tobacco developed and markets 
Vype. Japan Tobacco Inc. first acquired UK-based E-Lites and later purchased 
Logic, a major US e-cigarette brand (JTI 2014; JTI 2015).16 A notable exception to 
the dominance of global tobacco brands is Pax Labs, originally founded in 2007 as 
Ploom, which developed a novel e-cigarette product called Juul in 2015 and 
                                                      
15 The sale to Imperial was part of deal in which Reynolds American bought Lorillard for $27.4 billion. 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/briansolomon/2014/07/15/reynolds-lorillard-dump-blu-e-cigarettes-in-27-billion-
merger/#4849ab5bd1c6.  
16 Japan Tobacco also owns a minority interest in Ploom, a California-based leaf vaporizer.  
 
founded a new company, Juul Labs, in 2017. Sales of Juul increased more than 
600% in 2017, and by mid-2018 Juul accounted for over 60% of all e-cigarette 
sales in the US (Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids 2018). 
Collectively, these companies bring to e-cigarettes an extraordinary amount 
of wealth, market savvy, and regulatory experience. They have pumped 
significant resources into marketing and advertising, carefully avoiding claims 
about the intended use of their products (claiming that e-cigarettes are intended 
to help smokers quit, for example, invites regulation as a smoking cessation 
device, which brings them under the ambit of pharmaceutical regulators). They 
hire top law firms that provide expert corporate advice and litigation defense. 
And they have teams of lobbyists who know how to work the corridors of power 
and influence regulators. Globally, e-cigarette regulators must contend with 
companies that successfully evaded government regulation for most of the 20th 
century. 
The key forces at play in US tobacco regulation have greatly influenced the 
regulation of e-cigarettes. First, the tobacco industry consists of a number of 
private companies, some of which have grown into the world’s most robust 
multinational corporations. Those corporations now control the US e-cigarette 
industry. Second, tobacco companies have worked hard and spent aggressively to 
protect themselves from regulation, and are doing the same to fend off and/or 
shape e-cigarette regulation. Third, for over a century the government has taken 
a relatively hands-off approach to tobacco regulation, which has changed only 
since the enactment of the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act in 
2009. But that Act only allows the FDA to regulate certain enumerated tobacco 
products, not including e-cigarettes. So the FDA is engaged in a lengthy effort to 
‘deem’ e-cigarettes as tobacco products under the Act (Deeming Tobacco 
Products To Be Subject to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, as Amended 
by the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (Proposed Rule) 2015; 
FDA 2011).17 Fourth, a combination of municipal, state, and federal regulations 
now restrict the sale and use of tobacco in a variety of ways: only adults can 
purchase tobacco products, such products can only be used in certain places, 
advertising tobacco products is restricted, tobacco is subject to various types of 
taxation, and more. As a matter of convenience if not coherence, e-cigarettes 
have in some places been folded into those laws. Fifth, the tobacco control 
community consistently presses for further regulation of tobacco that will 
                                                      
17 Deeming Tobacco Products To Be Subject to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, as Amended by the 
Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (Proposed Rule), FDA (Aug. 8, 2015) 
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/Reports/EconomicAnalyses/ucm394922.htm (detailing 
efforts by the FDA to promulgate regulations that would give the FDA authority to regulate e-cigarettes); 
 Stakeholder Letter: Regulation of E-Cigarettes and Other Tobacco Products (Apr. 25, 2011), 
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/PublicHealthFocus/ucm252360.htm (describing the FDA’s intent to extend its 
authority to regulate e-cigarettes under the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009). 
improve public health. But it is divided as to how best to manage e-cigarettes, 
because there is broad disagreement as to whether e-cigarettes are more or a 
threat or an asset to public health. In short, the spectrum of economic and 
political interests that shaped US tobacco policy are now defining US e-cigarette 
policy.  
The key institutions and interests at play in the US are dramatically 
different from those that characterize the economic and political framework of 
tobacco regulation in Japan. In the late 19th century the Japanese government 
took control of tobacco leaf cultivation through the Leaf Tobacco Monopoly Law, 
and the 1904 Tobacco Monopoly Law completed the state’s monopolization of 
the cultivation, manufacture, and sale of tobacco products (Executory Order and 
Reasons for a Tobacco Manufacturing Monopoly 1991).18 Creating a tobacco 
monopoly brought a number of benefits to the government. One was that it 
facilitated the collection of tobacco-related taxes, which initially helped to fund 
the Russo-Japanese War and ultimately constituted a significant portion of the 
country’s total tax revenue (Rothacher 1989; Honjo and Kawachi 2000)19 In 
                                                      
18 For a detailed official history of the tobacco monopoly, see Tabako Senbaishi, [A History of the Tobacco 
Monopoly], Nihon Tabako Sangyō K.K. Shashi Hensan-shitsu, 6th ed., 1991, volumes 1-6. 
19 At one point tobacco constituted 18% of total government tax-related revenue, a figure that had declined to 1-
2% today. Albrecht Rothacher, Japan’s Agro-Food Sector: The Politics and Economics of Excess Protection, London: 
MacMillan, 1989, 87. See also, Kaori Honjo and Ichiro Kawachi, “Effects of Market Liberalization on Smoking in 
Japan,” Tobacco Control, vol. 9, 193-200, 2000, 193. 
addition, and in what foreshadowed tobacco-related trade conflict between the 
US and Japan in the 1980s, the government worried about the increasing 
prominence of the US tobacco industry and its impact on the health of its 
domestic tobacco market (Levin 1997; Executory Order and Reasons for a 
Tobacco Manufacturing Monopoly 1991, 7).20 A tobacco monopoly, in the 
government’s view, was the best way to protect its domestic interests.  
There was a third benefit of the tobacco monopoly; it created a set of 
institutional relationships that continue to serve the needs of key tobacco policy 
players—the state, tobacco growers, and Japan’s dominant political party (the 
Liberal Democratic Party, or LDP). In the context of tobacco policy, the most 
significant government actor is the Ministry of Finance (MoF), which oversaw the 
monopoly until 1985 and continues to be the locus of the government’s tobacco 
strategy. MoF told tobacco farmers how much land they could cultivate and how 
many plants they could grow. It owned and operated cigarette factories 
throughout the country. It licensed tobacco retailers, and set the price of tobacco 
products. After 1985, when the tobacco monopoly was eliminated, MoF 
                                                      
20 See, for example, Executory Order and Reasons for a Tobacco Manufacturing Monopoly (Tabako seizō sembai 
seido riyū oyobi shikō junjo), quoted in Tabako Sembai-shi [A History of the Tobacco Monopoly], Nihon Tabako 
Sangyō K.K. Shashi Hensan-shitsu, 6th ed., 1991, volume 1, p.7, translated and discussed in Mark Levin’s detailed 
article about Japanese tobacco regulation, “Smoke Around the Rising Sun: An American Look at Tobacco 
Regulation in Japan,” Stanford Journal of Law and Policy 8(1), 99-123, 1997. 
continued to be the controlling shareholder in Japan’s only tobacco company, 
Japan Tobacco (JT), and it (not the Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare) makes 
all important tobacco policy decisions.  
Tobacco growers appear to have flourished under this scheme. They were 
guaranteed a buyer for all of their tobacco leaf, and received a generous price for 
their crops. In exchange, they were loyal to their patrons by showing up at the 
voting booth and supporting the LDP. The disproportionate weight accorded to 
rural votes in Japan made the support of tobacco farmers (and agriculture more 
generally) particularly valuable. Japan Tobacco, Japan’s sole tobacco company, 
was also a beneficiary of the system. For many years JT was the sole purveyor of 
tobacco products in Japan, and it continues to be protected from undue foreign 
competition. The high post-war rate of tobacco consumption in Japan brought 
significant revenue to MoF and JT, and JT’s international division, Japan Tobacco 
International (JTI), is now a major global tobacco player.  
When e-cigarettes appeared in Japan in the early 2000s, everyone could 
easily evaluate their preferred policy outcomes. JT had not yet invested in the e-
cigarette business, so keeping the domestic market free of competition was a 
priority. From MoF’s perspective, the decline in tobacco consumption in Japan 
since the 1970s had resulted in decreasing tobacco-related government revenue, 
and a further decline caused by Japanese cigarette smokers switching to foreign 
e-cigarettes was undesirable (Funatogawa, Funatogawa, and Tano 2013). For 
health regulators at the MHLW, long excluded from tobacco regulation by MoF, e-
cigarettes were an opportunity to extend their regulatory turf. Tobacco growers, 
retailers, and others in the industry could not have welcomed competition from 
e-cigarettes, and members of the LDP had little to gain from a policy that opened 
the Japanese market to e-cigarettes. In short, the political and economic interests 
of the key players leaned clearly against a liberal regulatory posture for e-
cigarettes. By deciding that e-cigarettes were not tobacco products and would 
instead be regulated under the Pharmaceutical Affairs Law, MHLW and MoF 
effectively kept nicotine-containing e-cigarettes out of Japan.21  
Like Japan, China also has a long history of tobacco cultivation and 
consumption. The commercialized growth of tobacco started in the 16th century, 
and by the 1750s tobacco had become an important source of revenue for both 
central and local government (Benedict 2011, 2). In 1981 China created a state 
tobacco monopoly controlled by an agency with two parts; the State Tobacco 
Monopoly Administration (STMA), charged with regulating and monitoring the 
                                                      
21 In contrast, the Japanese government permits the sale of so-called heat-not-burn products, which use a 
vaporizing technology similar to e-cigarettes but contain processed leaf tobacco rather than liquid. Such products 
fit the government’s definition of ‘tobacco products,’ and therefore have been folded into the preexisting 
regulatory framework for combustible cigarettes.  
tobacco industry, and China National Tobacco Company (CNTC), tasked with the 
production, procurement, processing, and pricing of tobacco leaf and the 
marketing of cigarettes (Li 2012, 82).  
With 300 million smokers (25% of all smokers globally) who consume 40% 
of the world’s cigarettes, the political, economic, and health impacts of tobacco in 
China are enormous (Li 2012, ix).22 The most significant issue is revenue; as Chart 
1 demonstrates, the tobacco industry is a cash cow, even in China’s rapidly 
expanding economy, and tobacco-related taxes are critical to the state’s coffers 
(Baojiang 2010;  Li 2012, x; USDA and FAS 2000).23 The tobacco sector is also a 
major employer, providing jobs for more than 500,000 people, with an additional 
20 million deriving some income from tobacco, including 1.3 million farming 
households and 5 million retail workers (Martin 2014).  
 
Chart 1: Assets, Revenue and Profit of China’s Tobacco Processing and 
Manufacturing Industries (1985-2009) 
                                                      
22 Ibid, p.ix. China’s total cigarette production is approximately four times greater than the United States, the 
world’s second largest tobacco-producing country.  
23Li Baojiang, “Effects of increasing tobacco taxes on government revenue and consumption in China,”Acta 
Tabacaria Sinica, October 2010, Vol. 16 No. 5. The central government collects a tobacco excise tax, a value-added 
tax and a certain amount of net profit from the China National Tobacco Corporation. Tobacco taxes combined with 
profit constituted over 6% of total government income in 2014, and considerably more in previous years. (“Over 
the past decade, the tobacco industry has consistently contributed 7-10 percent of total annual central 
government revenues, similar to a number of lucrative and fast-growing sectors such as real estate and 
petroleum.” Cheng Li, The Political Mapping of China’s Tobacco Industry and Anti-Smoking Campaign, Brookings, 
2012, x.) See also Global Agriculture Information Network, United States Department of Agriculture, “Peoples 
Republic of China, Tobacco and Products, Tobacco Update 2000,” GAIN Report #CH0044, 1, which states that China 
derives 10% of its total tax revenue from tobacco.   
 
Source: Li 2012, 89.  
 
The economic importance of tobacco is underscored by the regulatory power of 
the State Tobacco Monopoly Administration (STMA), which through the China 
National Tobacco Corporation (CNTC) controls the Chinese cigarette industry. The 
CNTC oversees tobacco growth, production, sales, human resources, finance, 
marketing, and trade, and includes 33 provincial subsidiaries (Tobacco Monopoly 
Administrations) and a multitude of industrial and commercial enterprises. At the 
regional level, a tobacco leaf tax (20%) flows directly to local government, 
together with 25% of the national value-added tax. In provinces like Yunnan and 
Guizhou, the epicenters of China’s tobacco production, tobacco is the “pillar of 
the economy (Li 2012).”  
Superficially, the Chinese government has made tobacco control a policy 
priority. It signed and ratified the WHO’s Framework Convention on Tobacco 
Control, and in 2007 the State Council established the "FCTC Implementation 
Inter-Ministerial Coordination Leading Group," with members from a spectrum of 
relevant ministries (World Health Organization n.d.). That group has discussed the 
possibility of prohibiting tobacco advertising in the mass media, banning tobacco 
use in indoor public places, and forbidding sales to minors.24 More recently, the 
China Tobacco Control Plan proposed measures like prohibiting smoking in public 
places, strengthening warnings on cigarette packets, and banning tobacco 
promotion and sponsorship (Feldman and Yue 2016). 
Nonetheless, the political and economic importance of tobacco in China 
ensures that tobacco control policy will remain weak and ineffective (Hong 2014; 
Lv, Su, Hong 2011; Li 2012, x). Per capita smoking rates are high, second-hand 
smoke exposure is ubiquitous, youth access is widespread, and public education is 
poor. Rather than limit per capita tobacco consumption, CNTC’s goal is to improve 
tobacco sales and profits. As a distinguished scholar of Chinese politics puts it,  
                                                      
24The Smoking Control Ordinance of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone focused on strengthening the enforcement 
of smoking-bans in public places. It created six municipal agencies; Public Security Bureau, Urban Management 
Bureau, Transportation Commission, Health Supervision Bureau, Sports and Tourism Bureau and Market 
Supervision Bureau, responsible for enforcing the Ordinance in their own domains. From March 1 to December 31 
2014, 100,253 public places were inspected and 8,675 people were administratively fined a total of ￥420,100. 
Shenzhen, where the most aggressive smoking regulations were implemented in 2014, is seen as a model tobacco 
control city in China. 
Despite growing public concern over the smoking epidemic’s severe health 
consequences, as well as the massive long-term economic burden it 
presents, Chinese authorities have been slow to acknowledge this 
increasingly devastating public health crisis. Their hesitance to effectively 
curtail tobacco production and consumption is driven primarily by the fact 
that the tobacco industry is one of the largest sources of tax revenue for 
the Chinese government (Li 2012, x) 
 Likewise, an historian of the Chinese tobacco industry argues that “a major 
barrier to effective tobacco control in China remains the significant economic 
clout wielded by China’s highly profitable tobacco industry (Benedict 2011, 253). 
With these political and economic factors in mind, how should one expect 
the government to regulate e-cigarettes?  One option might be to reign in the 
proliferation of private e-cigarette manufacturers by including them in the state 
e-cigarette monopoly, enabling the government to capture revenue generated by 
the e-cigarette business. Another approach might be to protect the combustible 
tobacco industry by prohibiting e-cigarettes. A third option could involve 
regulating e-cigarettes as tobacco products, but allowing private e-cigarette 
enterprises to operate. Faced with these and perhaps other regulatory options, 
the government has so far taken no action; it does not regulate e-cigarettes as 
medical devices, dangerous chemicals, pharmaceutical products, or tobacco 
products. No government agency has been tasked with the regulation of e-
cigarettes, and those agencies that could plausibility take the reins—the Ministry 
of Health, the CNTC, the State Administration of Work Safety, the State 
Administration for Industry and Commerce, the State Food and Drug 
Administration—have each disclaimed responsibility (Feldman and Yue 2016). 
What one finds in China, therefore, is an e-cigarette market unburdened by 
regulation, at least until the government determines that some form of regulation 
is politically and economically advantageous.25 
It is no surprise that political pressures, financial interests, and institutional 
arrangements play an important role in determining how policies are shaped, 
which policies are adopted, and how vigorously policies are enforced. When the 
stakes are high, the influence of such factors can be particularly acute. Tobacco 
policy is one such area: the financial interests of parties as diverse as 
multinational corporations and individual farmers are strong; the political stakes 
are considerable; and a wide array of institutional actors have skin in the game. 
What is true for tobacco turns out to be true for e-cigarettes, with many of the 
                                                      
25 At this point, the most likely scenario was presented in an article by Li Baojiang, deputy director of the STMA, 
who told China Daily: "Regulating e-cigarettes, like traditional tobacco products under the State monopoly, is 
highly feasible. And that helps with consumer safety and rights, product quality control and the government 
coffers."  
same players involved in tobacco regulation staking out positions regarding e-
cigarette regulation. The different goals and interests of those players help to 
explain the divergent approaches to e-cigarette regulation the US, Japan, and 
China.  
 
E-CIGARETTES AND THE COURTS 
In addition to the absence of scientific consensus and the influence of 
political and economic interests, the role of courts in the policymaking process 
also helps to explain divergent e-cigarette policies in the US, Japan, and China. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, there is only one jurisdiction in which the courts have 
powerfully influenced e-cigarette policy—the United States. In neither Japan nor 
China have the courts played even a minor role in determining if, or how, the 
government should regulate e-cigarettes. In the US, however, courts have been a 
central actor, arguably the central actor, in the evolving debate over e-cigarette 
regulation.  
Between late 2008 and early 2009, as the e-cigarette business was taking 
off in the US, the FDA detained a series of e-cigarette shipments at Los Angeles 
International Airport and ordered the importers to destroy or export their wares  
(Feldman 2014). The FDA claimed that the importers were violating the Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act; in the agency’s view, e-cigarettes were combination 
drugs/drug delivery devices that required FDA evaluation for safety and efficacy 
(21 U.S.C. § 360d (1938)). Not surprisingly, the merchants held a different view. 
Their products should not be regulated as drugs, they argued, because they had 
not made any representations about their impact on health, a fundamental 
aspect of the legal definition of a drug. Seeking legal relief, the importers filed a 
claim in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, in what is 
now known as Smoking Everywhere vs. FDA (Smoking Everywhere, Inc. v. Food & 
Drug Admin. 2010)). 
The FDA’s position was complicated by two factors. One was that after a 
century without the legal authority to regulate combustible tobacco products, 
Representative Henry Waxman in 2009 introduced the Family Smoking Prevention 
and Tobacco Control Act, which provided the FDA with the legal authority to 
regulate certain combustible tobacco products (FDA 2018).26 Although regulating 
tobacco had long been a goal of the FDA, the timing was inauspicious. Without 
regulatory authority over tobacco, the FDA could potentially justify treating e-
cigarettes as pharmaceuticals. Once Congress gave it jurisdiction, regulating e-
                                                      
26  See Tobacco Control Act,  FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, 
http://www.fda.gov/TobaccoProducts/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/ucm298595.htm (last visited 
Feb. 23, 2015) (describing how the Tobacco Control Act of 2009 gives the FDA broad authority to regulate the 
manufacture, distribution, and marketing of tobacco products). 
cigarettes as drugs/drug delivery devices became more difficult. Filing their 
complaint to coincide with the passage of the Tobacco Control Act, plaintiff e-
cigarette corporations insisted that their products be regulated as tobacco, not 
pharmaceuticals, since under the latter e-cigarettes would be subject to a lengthy, 
costly, and potentially unsuccessful approval process.27 
The second factor that complicated the FDA’s position was presiding judge 
Richard Leon, who earlier in his career served as Republican chief counsel 
investigating Whitewater (Smoking Everywhere, Inc. v. Food & Drug Admin. 
2010)). Described as “a conservative…who does not shrink from criticizing the 
federal government on matters as varied as pornography, death penalty, drugs, 
and terrorism suspects at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba,” Judge Leon’s general 
antipathy toward government has also surfaced in a series of decisions involving 
the FDA (Stolberg 2013). In three cases brought against the agency—e-cigarettes, 
graphic warning labels on cigarette packets, and mentholated cigarettes—the 
judge handed the FDA stinging defeats. 
Judge Leon’s ruling in the Smoking Everywhere, affirmed on appeal, made a 
relatively straightforward argument. If the FDA wants to regulate e-cigarettes, the 
                                                      
27 The FDA requires data on safety and efficacy before drugs can be sold, and e-cigarette manufactures have no 
such data.  
judge argued, it can do so. In the absence of claims that the products are being 
sold as smoking cessation devices, however, it can only regulate them under the 
Tobacco Control Act, not as pharmaceuticals. Judge Leon did not simply reject the 
FDA’s regulatory approach; he also called into question the FDA’s motives.  
This case appears to be yet another example of FDA’s aggressive efforts to 
regulate recreational tobacco products as drugs or devices under the Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA).  Ironically, notwithstanding that Congress 
has now taken the unprecedented step of granting FDA jurisdiction over 
those products, FDA remains undeterred.  Unfortunately, its tenacious 
drive to maximize its regulatory power has resulted in its advocacy of an 
interpretation of the relevant law that I find, at first blush, to be 
unreasonable and unacceptable (Smoking Everywhere, Inc. v. Food & Drug 
Admin. 2010, 72, 78). 
Reflecting on Sottera and other tobacco-related cases, Matthew L. Myers, 
President of the Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids, argues that Judge Leon “has 
fundamentally altered FDA’s authority and ability to carry out its congressional 
mandate (Levin 2014).”28 Indeed, in the absence of Sottera, the US would have 
                                                      
28 Cases are randomly assigned, which meant that Judge Leon’s chance of being assigned all three was one in 
1,859http://www.fairwarning.org/2014/09/fda-batting-o-3-federal-judge/.  
been on the same regulatory path as Japan, with e-cigarettes effectively banned 
until manufacturers could present evidence that they were safe and effective 
nicotine replacement therapies. Instead, because of Judge Leon’s decision in 
Smoking Everywhere, the FDA can only regulate e-cigarettes as tobacco products, 
a long and arduous task that is still underway (FDA 2014).29 
The Sottera case has exerted tremendous influence on US e-cigarette 
policy. It denied the FDA’s efforts to apply drug regulation to e-cigarettes, and 
instead made the new Tobacco Control Act the only plausible regulatory option. 
Yet the fact that a complex policy choice was fundamentally shaped by the courts 
is of little surprise in the US, where scholars have long acknowledged the role of 
courts in the policymaking process (Kagan 2003.)  The difference between the 
influence of the courts on e-cigarette policy in the US and in Japan/China could 
not be more vivid. In neither Japan nor China has there been any litigation over e–
cigarette policy; it is difficult even to imagine a legal challenge to the regulatory 
authority of, for example, Japan’s Ministry of Finance over e-cigarettes, or of 
China’s CNTC. Judicial policymaking is not the only explanation for the divergence 
                                                      
29 To do so requires a number of time-consuming and difficult administrative maneuvers, which the FDA has been 
pursing since April 2014.Food and Drug Administration, “Deeming Tobacco Products To Be Subject to the Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, as Amended by the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act; 
Regulations on the Sale and Distribution of Tobacco Products and Required Warning Statements for Tobacco 
Products,” 79 FR 23141, April 25, 2014. 
of e-cigarette regulations in the US, Japan, and China, but it is one important part 
of the puzzle.  
 
CONCLUSION 
A paper on comparative e-cigarette regulation may not the obvious way to 
pay homage to Malcolm Feeley. The topic does not speak to fundamental 
tensions in criminal law and procedure for which Malcolm is so justly celebrated, 
nor does it directly engage his interest in Federalism. Nonetheless, several aspects 
of Malcolm’s work are critically important to how the paper is structured. First, 
like so much of Malcolm’s work, the paper is explicitly comparative. Rather than 
focus on e-cigarette regulation in a single jurisdiction, it looks across three 
different nations so as to better analyze the range of factors that influence policy 
in each of them. Second, Malcolm’s work often engages complex policy choices, 
and analyzes the range of policy approaches available to state actors. This study 
follows his example by exploring a thorny policy question—the regulation of e-
cigarettes—and examining a spectrum of policy approaches. Third, Malcolm’s 
work is almost always concerned with the law in action, and demonstrates a deep 
engagement with how legal rules and practices affect the populace, particular 
marginalized populations. This paper indirectly reflects that concern; the use of 
combustible tobacco has been increasingly relegated to those with lower incomes 
and less education, and e-cigarette policy will undoubtedly have an impact on the 
social gradient of smoking, though the details of that impact are not yet clear.  
Those central aspects of Malcolm’s work motivate this paper. A 
comparative analysis of e-cigarette policy reveals that three important 
jurisdictions—the US, Japan, and China—have taken starkly different approaches 
to the regulation of e-cigarettes. Divergence, not convergence, describes the 
landscape of e-cigarette regulation, for three reasons; the unclear scientific and 
epidemiological impact of e-cigarettes, the economic and political interests of key 
actors, and the role of the courts. Although this paper underscores the particular 
importance of those reasons, one can easily identify other possible explanations 
that the paper leaves unexplored. Malcolm gets the final word: “I would hope 
that the evidence and observations I present here will be tested against additional 
information…Only if such collective work takes place can social science proceed 
successfully (Feeley 1992, xxxiv.).” 
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